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Despite wide-ranging efforts by governments in Europe to address domestic violence, the problem continues to exist at alarming levels. According to a 2006 report 
issued by the Council of Europe, 20 to 25 percent of all women 
in Europe have experienced physical violence at least once dur-
ing their adult lives.1 In Turkey, that number is significantly 
higher. Researchers have estimated that up to 40 percent of mar-
ried women in Turkey have been abused by a partner or spouse.2 
Even more disturbing is the widespread impunity enjoyed 
throughout Europe by perpetrators of this violence.
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
attacks domestic violence head on. On June 9, 2009, the Court 
announced its judgment in Opuz v. Turkey,3 a case brought by a 
victim of domestic violence against the Turkish government for 
failing to protect her and her mother from attacks perpetrated 
by her husband. Ruling for the plaintiff, the Court found that 
the Turkish government violated three articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights:4 Article 2, the right to life; Article 
3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment; and Article 
14, the prohibition of discrimination. Critically, the Opuz deci-
sion holds governments accountable for failing to take adequate 
steps to protect victims of repeated domestic violence, even 
absent any active malfeasance on the state’s part. Additionally, 
the decision marked the first time the Court recognized that the 
failure of states to address gender-based domestic violence can 
amount to a form of discrimination under the Convention.
a CyCle oF violenCe, a Failure to aCt
Nahide Opuz married H.O. in 1995, and the couple settled 
down in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır.5 Shortly 
thereafter, H.O. began regularly abusing Opuz and members of 
her family. In 1995, H.O. attacked Opuz and her mother, threat-
ening to kill them both. Just one year later, H.O. severely beat 
Opuz, causing bleeding in both her eye and ear. In each of these 
instances, the local prosecutor filed criminal charges. The local 
court, however, dismissed both cases after Opuz and her mother 
withdrew their complaints out of fear for their safety.6 This 
cycle of violence, followed by a failure of local authorities to 
initiate criminal proceedings against H.O., was repeated numer-
ous times over the next several years, with the attacks becoming 
progressively more violent.
In February 1998, H.O. pulled a knife and attacked Opuz, 
her mother, and her sister, incapacitating each for several days. 
The local prosecutor decided not to file charges against H.O. 
because of lack of evidence.7 A month later H.O. drove his car 
into Opuz and her mother, causing serious injuries.8 Following 
repeated death threats from her husband, Opuz filed for divorce 
and requested police protection.9 The local prosecutor filed 
criminal charges, and H.O. was placed in detention. In October 
1998, however, Opuz and her mother again withdrew their 
complaints out of fear of retaliation. Due to the seriousness of 
the alleged acts, the local court nevertheless convicted H.O. and 
sentenced him to three months imprisonment. The sentence was 
later reduced to a mere fine.10
In October 2001, H.O. stabbed Opuz seven times with a 
knife during an argument. Shortly thereafter, Opuz’s mother’s 
attorney petitioned the local prosecutor’s office, noting that 
both Opuz and her mother had been previously compelled to 
withdraw complaints against H.O. because of his continuous 
death threats.11 Although the court issued a fine for the knife 
assault, H.O.’s threats continued, and no further charges were 
filed against him.12
The violence came to a climax when Opuz’s mother attempted 
to move to another community in March 2002. H.O. confronted 
Opuz’s mother, and in plain view of a witness, took out a gun 
and shot the mother. She died instantly.13 H.O. was charged 
with and convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.14 
The local court later lowered the sentence to 15 years in light of 
H.O.’s good behavior during trial. Pending appeal, however, the 
local court released H.O.15 
In 2002, Opuz brought an application before the European 
Court of Human Rights, alleging that the Turkish government 
violated three articles of the Convention. First she argued that 
the Turkish government violated Article 2,16 the right to life, and 
Article 3,17 the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, for 
the murder of her mother and her own anguish and suffering, 
respectively.18 While none of the domestic abuse was inflicted 
under state supervision, Opuz asserted that the Turkish govern-
ment violated the Convention by failing to protect her and her 
mother, despite a known pattern of violent abuse and threats to 
their lives.19 Additionally, Opuz argued that Turkey’s violations 
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of Article 2 and Article 3 also amounted to a violation of Article 
14,20 the prohibition of discrimination. Opuz contended that the 
local authorities’ lackadaisical attempts to safeguard her and her 
mother reflected widespread gender discrimination in Turkish 
legal institutions and Turkish society in general.21
In its defense, the Turkish government argued principally 
that Opuz failed to exhaust domestic remedies prior to bring-
ing her case to the Court,22 a requirement for admissibility.23 
The Turkish government maintained that local authorities had 
provided an immediate and tangible response to Opuz and her 
mother, but that under the applicable domestic law, criminal 
prosecution depended on complaints lodged or pursued by the 
victim. Since Opuz and her mother consistently withdrew their 
complaints, Turkey asserted that authorities were unable to go 
forward with prosecuting H.O.24 
From PrivaCy to Positive obligations: Court 
PreCedent on domestiC violenCe
European Court of Human Rights precedent addressing 
domestic violence against women is scarce. While the Court has 
adjudicated cases in which women have been the victim of state 
violence,25 it has rarely addressed cases of domestic violence, 
where the perpetrator is a non-state actor such as a spouse, part-
ner, or other family member. Finding a state in violation of the 
Convention in a domestic violence case requires a showing that 
the government failed to adequately protect a plaintiff from the 
actions of a private person.
Expecting a state to intervene to protect a private citizen 
from another private citizen raises considerable policy concerns. 
The state must know at what point it would need to intervene 
in a domestic relationship, and whether such an intervention 
amounts to excessive government interference in private affairs. 
Indeed, Article 8 of the Convention, the right to respect for pri-
vate and family life, states specifically that “[t]here shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country.”26 In interpret-
ing Article 8 obligations, both the Court and European govern-
ments have traditionally considered family life and relationships 
between private individuals a matter beyond the purview of the 
state.27
Nonetheless, the Court has developed a body of precedent 
defining the point at which a government is responsible for 
intervening in cases of violence or abuse within the private 
sphere. It first addressed this problem in Airey v. Ireland,28 a 
case in which a low-income woman could not hire an attorney 
to represent her in divorce proceedings against her abusive hus-
band. Airey argued that Article 8 imposed a positive obligation 
upon the Irish government to provide access to legal proceedings 
and services enabling her to seek a divorce. Siding with Airey 
the Court noted that, although Article 8 generally protects pri-
vate life from undue interference by governments, it may also at 
times do the opposite and obligate governments to take affirma-
tive steps to allow individuals the ability to enjoy their private 
life.29 Airey’s personal right to enjoy respect for her private life 
required an ability to divorce her abusive husband. Ireland’s 
failure to make family law legal services available to Airey thus 
violated Article 8.30
Subsequent cases, including Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, con-
firmed this new line of reasoning.31 The plaintiff in Bevacqua 
sought a divorce and custody of her child from her abusive hus-
band. She alleged that Bulgaria failed to adequately protect her 
from her husband or initiate proper legal proceedings with due 
diligence.32 While again recognizing that the primary purpose of 
Article 8 was to prevent undue state intrusion into private life, 
the Court reasoned that respecting private and family life may 
include “a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate 
legal framework affording protection against acts of violence 
by private individuals.”33 This positive duty arises particularly 
for the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals.34 Because local 
authorities had disregarded Bevacqua’s complaints, the Court 
found Bulgaria in violation of Article 8 for failing to implement 
these positive obligations.35
The Court went even further in Kontrová v. Slovakia36 by 
delineating a specific standard articulating when governments 
are obligated to intervene in private matters. In Kontrová, which 
offers facts similar to those in Opuz, the plaintiff alleged that 
she had suffered years of physical and emotional abuse by her 
husband, including a beating with an electric cable that left her 
unable to work for a week.37 Her husband later threatened to kill 
himself and their children. Although Kontrová made a series of 
visits and phone calls to local police regarding these threats, they 
did little to intervene. Shortly thereafter her husband did in fact 
shoot and kill their children and himself.38 Kontrová argued and 
the Court found that Slovakia violated both Article 2 and Article 
8, for failing to adequately intervene.39 Importantly, the Court 
developed the following test detailing when a state must act to 
protect an individual under Article 2:
For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established 
that the authorities knew of or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk 
to the life of an identified individual from the criminal 
acts of a third party and that they failed to take mea-
sures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that 
risk.40
The Kontrová decision thus solidified a line of Court prec-
edent that state authorities do in fact have positive obligations to 
intervene within the private sphere in situations of clear and real 
danger to specific individuals.
three violations oF human rights
The Court’s decision in Opuz developed out of its precedent 
in cases such as Bevacqua and Kontrová. Yet, the judgment went 
further than many expected by clearly making prevention of vio-
lence against women in the domestic sphere a positive obligation 
of the state, and the systematic failure to act on this obligation a 
violation of the Convention’s prohibition of discrimination.
After rejecting the Turkish government’s argument that Opuz 
failed to exhaust domestic remedies,41 the Court proceeded into 
the merits of her case. Examining Opuz’s Article 2 allegation, 
the Court first reiterated the test enunciated in Kontrová — that 
Article 2 can impose a positive obligation on states to protect 
life in the private sphere, but not in a way that would impose 
an impossible burden on governments.42 That obligation exists 
when authorities know or should know that a real and immedi-
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ate risk to life exists, and that their intervention between private 
parties could reasonably prevent violence from occurring.43 
In the specific context of domestic violence, the Court also 
articulated additional factors that a government should consider 
in determining when a state should intervene under Article 2 
and Article 8, including, among others, the seriousness of the 
alleged offense; whether or not a weapon was used; the amount 
of threats and degree of planning behind the violence; the effects 
of domestic violence on children living in the household; and 
the previous history of the alleged perpetrator. Essentially, the 
more serious the alleged domestic abuse, or the more likely it is 
that serious abuse will continue, the greater the burden on local 
authorities to properly intervene.44
The Court then specifically examined whether Turkey ade-
quately fulfilled its Article 2 and Article 8 obligations by 
reviewing both the legal and factual context pertaining to Opuz’s 
situation. The applicable domestic law in Turkey’s criminal code 
prevented authorities from independently prosecuting cases 
without charges filed by a victim unless the alleged assault led 
to ten days of illness and unfitness for work. For the Court this 
standard was simply unrealistic, as it would fail to encompass 
many cases of domestic violence.45 Given H.O.’s history of 
threats and abuse, and the fact that Opuz and her mother had 
notified local authorities about his behavior numerous times, 
the Court stated that the authorities should have taken “special 
measures consonant with the gravity of the situation.”46 Because 
the authorities remained passive, despite persistent information 
that should have compelled them to act aggressively against 
H.O., the Court found the Turkish government violated Article 2 
for the death of Opuz’s mother.47
The Court then examined Opuz’s allegation that H.O.’s abu-
sive treatment of her and the local authorities’ subsequent failure 
to act constituted a violation of Article 3 — the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman treatment. Like its Article 2 analysis, the 
Court reiterated the principle that states have a positive obliga-
tion in some situations to protect at-risk individuals from Article 
3 violations by private citizens.48 Noting the history of abuse 
and threats, as well as “the vulnerable situation of women in 
south-east Turkey,”49 the Court held that Opuz’s abusive treat-
ment rose to the level of torture or inhuman treatment, which 
Article 3 was meant to prohibit.50 Given that local authorities 
had remained relatively passive in their treatment of H.O., the 
Court held that Turkey violated Article 3 by failing to adequately 
protect Opuz.51
Finally, the Court turned to Opuz’s allegation that Turkey 
violated Article 14 — the prohibition of discrimination — by not 
adequately protecting her and her mother’s Article 2 and Article 
3 rights. According to Court precedent,52 discrimination means 
“treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justifi-
cation, persons in relevantly similar situations,”53 and discrimi-
nation “may result from a de facto situation.”54 The Court also 
looked to human rights norms in other jurisdictions to determine 
how they treated violence against women. In doing so, the Court 
examined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention of Belém do 
Pará, and statements by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.55 Based on both the European Convention and these 
other international law instruments, the Court recognized that 
“the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this 
failure does not need to be intentional.”56
With these principles in mind, the Court examined whether 
or not victims of domestic violence in southeastern Turkey 
enjoyed equal protection of the law. Not surprisingly, the Court 
found ample evidence of discrimination against women. Reports 
examined by the Court from the Diyarbakır Bar Association, a 
local non-governmental organization, and Amnesty International 
documented numerous accounts of and statistics on domestic 
violence in southeastern Turkey, along with failures of police 
to properly investigate claims of abuse and unreasonable delays 
in judicial proceedings.57 The Court found that this indifference 
The decision recognizes that domestic violence against 
women is a systemic problem reflecting a fundamental 
imbalance of power. Although individual acts of violence 
within the private sphere can be attributed to specific 
persons, violence against women is generally perpetuated 
through male domination of judicial and law enforcement 
institutions. The Court’s judgment places a strong burden 
on states to protect women from domestic violence.
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and tolerance for domestic violence by local police and courts 
was widespread throughout Turkey.58 Given Opuz’s specific 
situation, and the overall failure of local authorities to protect 
women from domestic violence, the Court held the Turkish gov-
ernment was in violation of Article 14 for not properly protect-
ing her other Convention rights.59 
a landmark deCision For Women
The Court’s decision in Opuz is a landmark in the application 
of the Convention to domestic violence. The decision recognizes 
that domestic violence against women is a systemic problem 
reflecting a fundamental imbalance of power. Although individ-
ual acts of violence within the private sphere can be attributed to 
specific persons, violence against women is generally perpetu-
ated through male domination of judicial and law enforcement 
institutions.
The Court’s judgment places a strong burden on states to 
protect women from domestic violence. A number of hold-
ings in the Opuz judgment support this obligation. First, Opuz 
clearly confirms that states have positive obligations to protect a 
person’s Article 2, Article 3, and Article 8 rights when they are 
threatened by the actions of other private actors. Second, Opuz 
identifies when such positive obligations rise to the required lev-
els of necessary action. Third, Opuz directly states that domestic 
violence can amount to a violation the Article 3 prohibition 
of torture and inhuman treatment. Lastly, Opuz states that the 
failure to effectively protect women from domestic violence 
can amount to a state’s violation of the Article 14 prohibition 
of discrimination, even if unintentional. The Court’s decision 
thus adequately equips victims of domestic violence with legal 
recourse through the Convention to successfully pursue cases 
against states for failing to protect them.
The Court’s judgment means that in order to fulfill Convention 
obligations, European governments must aggressively pursue 
criminal proceedings in cases of alleged domestic violence, and 
such proceedings must be effective. Known patterns of continu-
ous and serious abuse, in particular, should not be tolerated. To 
this end, states should consider amending domestic violence 
and criminal assault and battery laws to give prosecutors greater 
discretion to pursue independent claims. These laws should also 
provide for more aggressive measures for repeat offenders. Even 
with new laws, prosecutors, judges, and police must redouble 
efforts to identify dangerous situations and make effective inter-
ventions. This might require particular vigilance in situations 
where victims are fearful of reporting abuse, a likely possibility 
in domestic violence scenarios.
The Opuz decision has clear social implications as well. 
Failure to adequately enforce Convention protections can arise 
from discrimination embedded in social institutions and prac-
tices. A showing of systemic discrimination can be supported 
by reports and statistics documenting a lack of sufficient law 
enforcement activity to protect women from domestic violence. 
Such indications of discrimination indicate a need for states to 
make wider reforms across law enforcement generally, including 
better human rights education and additional training of police 
and prosecutors.
ConClusion
Reaction to the Court’s judgment has been overwhelmingly 
positive, although somewhat cautious. Turkish human rights 
activists have hailed the ruling as a significant step forward, 
but recognize that on-the-ground enforcement by indifferent 
local authorities will remain the key challenge.60 Indeed, Turkey 
already has a long and unfortunate history of discrimination 
and human rights violations against Kurds and other minorities, 
and enforcement of the Court’s rulings on these issues has been 
severely lacking. Still, this judgment has enormous potential 
for women both in Turkey and throughout the continent. Maud 
de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe, noted that the Opuz decision could “make a differ-
ence for hundreds of thousands of women victims of domestic 
violence in Europe.”61 It is up to the individual governments, 
however, to protect the many women who, like Opuz, live daily 
with domestic violence.  HRB
The town walls of Diyarbakır, Turkey.
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